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Abstract — The paper analyzes systems vulnerability 
targeted by TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) 
segments when SYN flag is ON, which gives space for a 
DoS (Denial of Service) attack called SYN flooding 
attack or more often referred as a SYN flood attack.  The 
effects of this type of attack are analyzed and presented in 
OPNET simulation environment. Furthermore, the paper 
presents two anomaly detection algorithms as an effective 
mechanism against this type of attack. Finally, practical 
approaches against SYN flood attack for Linux and 
Windows environment which are followed by are shown. 
 
Index Terms — DoS, Flooding, SYN flooding, OPNET 
Modeler, Anomaly detection 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Today, the work of most of the important and crucial 
services dependent on rapid development of the 
technologies and their operation is almost inconceivable 
without the Internet usage, so any disruption in the 
operation of the Internet can be very inconvenient. 
Considering the fact that the Internet was originally 
designed for openness and scalability without much 
concern for security, it’s clear that the malicious users 
can exploit the design weaknesses of the Internet to 
wreak havoc in the operation of most of services.  
According to the last analyses cybercrime and 
hactivism became the primary motivation behind cyber-
attacks (Fig. 1) [1]. 
 
 
Figure 1: Motivations behind cyber-attacks in March, 2013 [1] 
 
Amongst many other types of cyber-attacks, the DoS 
attacks are major security threats to the services provided 
through the Internet resulting in large scale revenue 
losses. This conclusion can be confirmed by statistic 
given in Fig. 2 [1].  
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of attack techniques, March, 2013 [1] 
 
One specific kind of DoS attack which is large-scale 
cooperative attack, typically launched from a large 
number of compromised hosts, is Distributed Denial-of-
Service (DDoS). DDoS attacks are bringing about 
growing threats to businesses and Internet providers 
around the world. While many methods have been 
proposed to counter such attacks, they are either not 
efficient or not effective enough.  
 
 
Figure 3: DDoS flooding attacks statistic [2]
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Moreover, the analysis, as it is shown in Fig. 3, shows 
that the DDoS attacks which use TCP and SYN flood are 
the most prevalent among them [2]. However, flooding 
DDoS attacks are distinct from other attacks, for example, 
those that execute malicious code on their victim. These 
attacks floods the victim with a large volume of traffic 
and continuous data stream disables the victim from 
providing services to the legitimate users. Flooding 
DDoS attacks are the mass of all attacking packets 
directed at the victim, which poses the threat, rather than 
the contents of the packets themselves. In that context, 
these attacks are classified as resource depletion form of 
attacks. Moreover, these types of attacks pose the greatest 
problem in today’s network infrastructures. Subverting 
the use of protocols, such as TCP or UDP, enables an 
attacker to disrupt on-line services by generating a traffic 
overload to block links or cause routers near the victim to 
crash. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
gives related work in this area. Section 3 withdraws some 
simulation results and analysis of the effects of SYN and 
DDoS SYN flood attack. In Section 5 two effective 
anomaly detection algorithms are described and some 
practical examples to protect against this type of attack 
are explained. Finally, Section 6 concludes our work. 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
At the beginning the paper briefly describes 
operation of SYN flood attack (also known as a TCP-
SYN flooding attack). Then some relevant previous 
studies regarding this topic are discussed.  
A. SYN flood attack 
The TCP is connection oriented and reliable, in-
sequence delivery transport protocol. It provides full 
duplex stream of data octets and it is the main protocol 
for the Internet. Most nowadays services on Internet relay 
on TCP. For example mail (SMTP, port 25), old insecure 
virtual terminal service (telnet, port 23), file transport 
protocol (FTP, port 21) and most important in this case 
also is the hyper text transfer protocol (HTTP, 80) better 
known as the world wide web services (WWW). Almost 
everything uses TCP someway to do their 
communications over the network - at least the interactive 
ones.  
 
 
Figure 4: TCP Header 
 
In SYN flood attack, the “SYN” stands for the 
Synchronize flag in TCP headers. The SYN flag gets set 
when a system first sends a packet in a TCP connection, 
and indicates that the receiving system should store the 
sequence number included in this packet. Fig. 4 shows 
the TCP header, which is twenty bytes long without 
options. In this illustration each line represents four bytes. 
In this kind of flooding attack, the focus is given on the 
Flags, six different bits that may be sent to represent 
different conditions, such as initial sequence number 
(SYN), that the acknowledgement field is valid (ACK), 
reset the connection (RST), or close the connection (FIN).  
As it was mentioned before, in SYN flooding [3], the 
attacking system sends SYN request with spoofed source 
IP address to the victim host. These SYN requests appear 
to be legitimate. The spoofed address refers to a client 
system that does not exist. Hence, the final ACK message 
will never be sent to the victim server system. This results 
into increased number of half-open connections at the 
victim side. A backlog queue is used to store these half-
open connections. These half-open connections bind the 
resources of the server. Hence, no new connections 
(legitimate) can be made, resulting in DoS or DDoS.  
SYN flooding attack is a DoS method affecting hosts 
that run TCP server processes (Fig. 5). 
 
 
Figure 5: TCP State Transmission Diagram 
 
Although this paper is analyzing the effects of this 
attack on wireless networks, however considering the 
affected layer from this attack and the way of conducting 
the attack there is no main difference with the wired 
networks.  
The SYN flood attack is well-known DoS method 
which affects hosts that run TCP server processes (the 
three-way handshake mechanism of TCP connection). 
Nowadays, despite the original one, a lot of its variations 
can be seen. Although there are many effective 
techniques against SYN flood attack, and even RFC4987 
is covering some common mitigation techniques against 
this attack [4], yet there is no single mechanism (schemes) 
for effective defense.  
During the SYN flood attack [3], the attacking system 
sends SYN request with spoofed source IP address to the 
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victim host. These SYN requests appear to be legitimate. 
The spoofed address refers to a client system that does 
not exist. Hence, the final ACK message will never be 
sent to the victim server system. This results into 
increased number of half-open connections at the victim 
side. A backlog queue is used to store these half-open 
connections. These half-open connections bind the 
resources of the server. Hence, no new connections 
(legitimate) can be made, resulting in DoS or DDoS.  
Generally in the literature [3, 4], there are three types 
of SYN flood attacks, which are going out in the 
nowadays Internet networks: Direct Attack, Spoofing 
Attack and Distributed Direct Attack. 
  
 
Figure 6: SYN Flooding: Direct attack  
 
If attackers rapidly send SYN segments without 
spoofing their IP source address, this will cause direct 
attack (Fig. 6). This type of SYN flooding attack does not 
involve directly injecting or spoofing packets below the 
user level of the operating system of the attacker. One 
way to perform thid type of attack is by simply using 
many TCP connect() calls [5]. However, the attacker’s 
operation system must not respond to the SYN-ACKs, 
because any ACKs, RSTs, or ICMP (Internet Control 
Message Protocol) messages will allow the listener to 
move the TCB (Transmission Control Block) out of 
SYN-RECEIVED. In order to prevent its operating 
system from responding to the SYN-ACKs, the attacker 
can set some firewall rules which can filter outgoing 
packets to the listener (allowing only SYNs out), or filter 
incoming packets so that any SYN-ACKs are discarded 
before reaching the local TCP processing code.  
 
 
Figure 7: SYN Flooding: Spoofing attack  
 
On the other hand, the SYN spoofing attack (shown in 
Fig. 7) uses IP address spoofing, which might be 
considered more complex than the method used in a 
direct attack. During this type of SYN flooding attack 
instead of merely manipulating local firewall rules, the 
attacker also needs to be able to form and inject raw IP 
packets with valid IP and TCP headers. Moreover, the IP 
address spoofing techniques can be categorized into 
different types according to what spoofed source 
addresses are used in the attacking packets. 
 
 
Figure 8: SYN Flooding: Distributed direct attack 
 
A distributed version of the SYN flooding attack 
shown in Fig. 8 is the most dangerous amongst 
mentioned types of SYN flooding attacks. During this 
type of SYN flooding attack the attacker takes advantage 
of numerous zombie machines/processes throughout the 
Internet. In the case, the zombies use direct attacks, but in 
order to increase the effectiveness even further, each 
zombie could use a spoofing attack and multiple spoofed 
IP addresses. Currently, distributed attacks are feasible 
because there are several “botnets” or “zombie armies” of 
thousands of compromised machines that are used by 
criminals for DoS attacks. Because zombie machines are 
constantly added or removed from the armies and can 
change their IP addresses or connectivity, it is quite 
challenging to block those types of SYN flood attacks.
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B. Related work 
In the literature there are many methods and 
frameworks which are proposed in order to detect the 
SYN flood attacks. The authors of [3] detected the SYN 
flooding attacks at leaf routers that connect end hosts to 
the Internet, which utilizes the normalized difference 
between the number of SYNs packets and the number of 
FIN (RST) packets in a time interval. If the rate of SYNs 
packets is much higher than that of FIN (RST) packets by 
a non-parametric cumulative sum algorithm, the router 
recognizes that some attacking traffic is mixed into the 
current traffic. Similar work is presented in [6], where the 
fast and effective method for detecting SYN flood attacks 
is given. Moreover, a linear prediction analysis is 
proposed as a new paradigm for DoS SYN flood attack 
detection. The proposed mechanism makes use of the 
exponential backoff property of TCP used during 
timeouts. By modelling the difference of SYN and 
SYN&ACK packets, it is shown that this approach is able 
to detect an attack within short delays. Again this method 
is used at leaf routers and firewalls to detect the attack 
without the need of maintaining any state. However, 
considering the fact that the sources of attack can be 
distributed in different networks, there is a lack of 
analysis for the traffic near the sources and also the 
detection of the source of SYN flooding attack in TCP 
based low intensity attacks is missing.  
Moreover, a quite similar (with the previous two 
papers) approach was used in [7], which also considers a 
non-parametric cumulative sum algorithm; however the 
authors apply it to measure the number of only SYN 
packets, and by using an exponential weighted moving 
average for obtaining a recent estimate of the mean rate 
after the change of SYN packets. In [8] three counters 
algorithms for SYN flooding defense attacks are given. 
The three schemes include detection and mitigation. The 
detection scheme utilizes the inherent TCP valid SYN–
FIN pairs behavior, hence is capable of detecting various 
SYN flooding attacks with high accuracy and short 
response time. The mitigation scheme works in high 
reliable manner for victim to detect the SYN packets of 
SYN flooding attack. Although the given schemes are 
stateless and required low computation overhead, making 
itself immune to SYN flooding attacks, the attackers may 
retransmit every SYN packet more than one time to 
destroy the mitigation function. It is necessary to make it 
more robust and adaptive.  
In [9], the authors built a standard model generated by 
observations from the characteristic between the SYN 
packet and the SYN+ACK response packet from the 
server by a program for the activity of the server. The 
authors of [10] proposed a method to detect the flooding 
agents by considering all the possible kinds of IP 
spoofing, which is based on the SYN/SYN-ACK protocol 
pair with the consideration of packet header information. 
The Counting Bloom Filter is used to classify all the 
incoming SYN-ACK packets to the sub network into two 
streams, and a nonparametric cumulative sum algorithm 
is applied to make the detection decision by the two 
normalized differences, with one difference between the 
number of SYN packets and the number of the first SYN-
ACK packets and another difference between the number 
of the first SYN-ACK packets and the number of the 
retransmission SYN-ACK. Moreover, in [10] a simple 
and efficient method to detect and defend against SYN 
flood attacks under different IP spoofing types is 
proposed. The method makes use of a storage-efficient 
data structure and a change-point detection method for 
distinguishing complete three-way TCP handshakes from 
incomplete ones. The presented experiments in [11] 
consistently show that their method is both efficient and 
effective in defending against TCP-based flooding attacks 
under different IP spoofing types. However there is a lack 
of process automation within the sheme for setting the 
parameters. Additionally, the method is not evaluated in a 
reasonably large real network. 
Moreover, there are also some other related studies 
such as SYN cookies, SYN filtering mechanisms [12], 
SYN cache, SYN proxy (firewall), SYN kill, D-SAT [13] 
and DiDDeM ([14] and [15]), and more related studies is 
in [16], [17], [18] and [19]. In the [16] and [17] an early 
stage detecting method (ESDM) is proposed. The ESDM 
is a simple but effective method to detect SYN flooding 
attacks at the early stage. In the ESDM the SYN traffic is 
forecasted by autoregressive integrated moving average 
model, and non-parametric cumulative sum algorithm is 
used to find the SYN flooding attacks according to the 
forecasted traffic. The ESDM achieves shorter detection 
time and small storage space. However, these exiting 
methods or defense mechanisms which oppose to the 
SYN flooding attack are effective only at the later stages, 
when attacking signatures are obvious [17]. 
 
III. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS 
OF SYN AND SYN FLOOD DDOS ATTACK 
In this section the paper presents simulation 
experiment on SYN flooding attack. The section is 
subdivided into two subsections. The section starts giving 
the configuration of our whole test bed. Then it presents 
results obtained from specific scenarios. 
A. The Scenario Configuration 
In order to make a detailed analysis a scenario with 
three WLAN nodes is considered, where one of them is 
used for simulating data traffic, another for simulating the 
video and the third for voice transmission. The scenario 
takes place on 100x100m workspace and it is presented in 
Fig. 9. For serving different requirements (data, video, 
voice) from different nodes we used server is configured 
to support all the above services. The wireless 
communication is realized via a wireless access point. 
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Figure 9.  OPNET Scenario 
 
In this paper three different scenarios are reviewed: 
during the first scenario there is no attack, during the 
second scenario SYN flood attack is conducted, and 
during the third scenario we are considering the situation 
when the network is attacked by DDoS SYN flood attack. 
In all these scenarios as a basis a scenario without attack 
is considered, and what changes is the intensity of the 
attack, which depends on the number of attackers. The 
time of simulation is set to 20 minutes. It should be also 
mentioned that examined environment presented in this 
paper is 802.11e capable. 
B. Simulation Results and Analysis 
The average values from the obtained simulation 
results are presented. As results global statistic of the 
simulated scenario is shown. These statistics are scoped 
to the simulation as a whole, in contrast to local statistics, 
which are scoped to a particular queue or processor. In 
other words, multiple processes, as well as pipeline stages, 
all at different locations in the model's system, can 
contribute to the same shared statistic. This is done by 
referring to the statistic by name and obtaining a statistic 
handle. 
Although from the simulations a lot of results are 
obtained which only confirmed our expectation, however 
this paper will present only few of them. Considering the 
fact that in all scenarios there are three legitimate clients 
with different requirements from the server, hereinafter 
some of the obtained results considering each legitimate 
node individually are explained.  
1) Node: Voice 
In Fig. 10 the average voice jitters which occur during 
voice transmission in the situation when no attack is 
performed and when the wireless network is under the 
SYN and DDoS SYN Attack is presented. Even the jitter 
value when there is no attack conducted is 0, this value 
during attacks are dramatically increased. Special case is 
the situation when the network/server is attacked by 
DDoS SYN Attack which is causing higher voice jitter or 
higher voice packet delay variation.  
 
Figure 10.  Voice Application Jitter 
 
 
Figure 11.  Voice Application Packet Delay Variation 
 
The packet delay variation on voice application is 
shown in Fig. 11. This parameter shows the variance 
among end to end delays for voice packets received by 
this node. End to end delay for a voice packet is 
measured from the time it is created to the time it is 
received. Again, it is noticeable that this delay is 10 times 
higher when SYN flood attack is committed. The 
situation of DDoS attack is even worse. As it can be seen 
the delay is constantly increasing during this attack and it 
is even incomparable higher than the values from other 
two scenarios. 
2) Node: Video 
The wireless LAN delay (Fig. 12) represents the end-
to-end delay of all the data packets that are successfully 
received by the WLAN MAC and forwarded to the higher 
layer. This delay includes queuing and medium access 
delays at the source MAC, reception of all the fragments 
individually, and the relay of the frame via AP, if the 
source and destination MACs are non-AP MACs of the 
same infrastructure BSS. Increased number of attackers 
causes higher delay. 
Fig. 13 shows higher layer video data traffic dropped 
(in bits/sec) by the WLAN MAC due to full higher layer 
data buffer. In this case during the SYN flood attack by 
one attacker the value of this parameter is almost the 
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same with the scenario without attack. Opposite of this, in 
the case of DDoS attack the number of dropped packets is 
very high which is understandable if it is considered that 
the buffers are filled by multiple malicious nodes.  
 
 
Figure 12.  Video Application WLAN Delay 
 
 
Figure 13.  Video Application WLAN data dropped (buffer 
overflow) 
 
The wireless LAN delay (Fig. 12) represents the end-
to-end delay of all the data packets that are successfully 
received by the WLAN MAC and forwarded to the higher 
layer. This delay includes queuing and medium access 
delays at the source MAC, reception of all the fragments 
individually, and the relay of the frame via AP, if the 
source and destination MACs are non-AP MACs of the 
same infrastructure BSS. Increased number of attackers 
causes higher delay. 
Fig. 13 shows higher layer video data traffic dropped 
(in bits/sec) by the WLAN MAC due to full higher layer 
data buffer. In this case during the SYN flood attack by 
one attacker the value of this parameter is almost the 
same with the scenario without attack. Opposite of this, in 
the case of DDoS attack the number of dropped packets is 
very high which is understandable if it is considered that 
the buffers are filled by multiple malicious nodes.  
3)  Node: Data 
Fig. 14 shows the delay (in seconds) of segments 
received by the TCP layer in this node, for all 
connections. It is measured from the time a TCP segment 
is sent from the source TCP layer to the time it is 
received by the TCP layer in the destination node. Using 
this parameter we collect "TCP Delay" statistics for 
delays experienced by complete application packets 
submitted to TCP. This delay during the SYN flood 
attack is two time higher than the situation without attack, 
but again the worst case is  the scenario with conducted 
DDoS attack, where the value of TCP segment delay is 
seven time higher than the scenario without attack. 
The parameter TCP connection aborts (RTS Sent) 
shows the total number of TCP connections aborted 
because the maximum number of retransmissions has 
been reached (Fig. 15). Statistic is updated each time the 
connection is abort is initiated by the TCP process at this 
node. The method used by OPNET to calculate this 
parameter is incrementing each time a TCP connection is 
aborted at this node. There is not difference from the 
previous explanations. Against the worst case is the 
situation when the network is attacked by DDoS attack. 
Moreover, Fig. 16 shows the TCP load parameter or the 
total number of packets submitted to the TCP layer by the 
application layer in this node, for all connections. 
In case of SYN flood attack this total number of 
packets is reduced on half compared with scenario 
without attack, but situation is much better than the 
situation when DDoS attack is conducted, in which case 
the number of these packets is dramatically reduced. 
 
 
Figure 14.  Data TCP segment delay 
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Figure 15.  Data TCP connection aborts (RST sent) 
 
 
Figure 16.  Data TCP Load 
 
IV. PROTECTION AGAINST SYN FLOODING ATTACK 
The universal answer on the question how to protect 
against SYN attack is that this type of attack is a very 
problematic issue. 
In the case of SYN attack, the client does not return a 
response to a SYN / ACK packet, and does not return an 
ACK packet to the server to open connections between 
the client and server. Because of that the server remains 
with half-opened connections which are stored in 
memory, and until the timeout expiration the server tries 
to send a new SYN / ACK packet to the client. 
The base problem is the large quantities of generated 
"half-opened" connections which server keeps in memory 
until the expiration of their timeout, which can ultimately 
lead to server crash, but nowadays the most common 
consequence is the inability/sluggishness of opening a 
new connection due to the occupancy of the limit for the 
half-opened connections. 
Although one of the indicators can be increased CPU 
time and memory, today it will not be visible on the new 
generation of servers, or it will be marginally noticeable. 
In the case of web server what will surely be noticeable, 
at least at first glance, is extremely slow opening of the 
web pages without any "obvious" reasons such as 
overload of the servers’ resources or bandwidth link. 
In this chapter we are considering two effective 
anomaly detection algorithms which can be used as 
effective tools for detection of the SYN-Flooding attack. 
Furthermore practical solutions to defend against this 
attack in Linux and Windows environment are presented. 
A. Anomaly detection algorithms 
Considering the fact that flooding attacks cause 
significantly increased SYN segment traffic as opposed to 
the period when there is no attack it is obvious that most 
appropriate countermeasures against SYN- Flood attack, 
and flooding attacks at all, will be based on anomaly 
detection algorithms. Here this section presents two 
anomaly detection algorithms. The first, an adaptive 
threshold algorithm, is a simple algorithm that detects 
anomalies based on violations of a threshold that is 
adaptively set based on recent traffic measurements, and 
the second is based on a used anomaly detection 
algorithm cumulative sum (CUSUM) algorithm. 
Adaptive Threshold Algorithm: This is simple 
algorithm which measures network traffic (in our case 
SYN packets) and compare it with previously defined 
threshold. This threshold is adaptively set in certain 
period of time and is based on the estimated mean 
number of SYN packets. If measured traffic exceeds a 
particular threshold it will be defined as anomaly and 
alarm will be activated.  
Let us suppose that the number of SYN packet in the t-
th time interval is xt, and measured mean rate prior to t is 
μt-1. In this case the alarm condition is as following: 
If    (   )    , then ALARM signaled at time t, 
where α > 0 parameter indicates the percentage above 
mean value which is considered as a threshold. The mean 
μt can be computed over some past time window or using 
an exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) of 
previous measurements  
 
         (   )                                           ( ) 
 
where β is EWMA factor. 
Flow chart in Fig. 17a shows how adaptive threshold 
algorithm can be used for detecting SYN flood attacks. 
On the arrival of packets the algorithm checks if the 
packets are TCP, and if this is True it checks if TCP 
packets are SYN or other type of TCP. If the SYN bit is 
on than it will update the record. Calculating the μ and α 
rate than it will check the condition for xt either it is 
greater than (α + 1) μt-1 or not. If it is greater it will 
generate the alarm. 
Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) Algorithm: This 
algorithm is based on change-points detection techniques 
based on hypothesis testing, i.e., the rising and falling 
edges of the anomalous period, which denotes the 
duration that the anomaly lasts, without prior knowledge 
on the distribution of the traffic flow. When the mean of a 
subset of samples becomes higher than a threshold, a 
change point is registered, and the level of change is 
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cumulated into an accumulator. The accumulator begins 
to discharge when the other change point is detected at 
the end of the anomaly period [7,20]. This algorithm was 
developed for independent and identically distributed 
random variables. According to the approach, there are 
two hypotheses, where the first corresponds to the 
statistical distribution prior to a change and the second to 
the distribution after a change. If s(y) is positive, the 
monitored random variable more likely conforms to the 
distribution after change than to the distribution before 
change. This is also a simple algorithm which measures 
network traffic (in our case SYN packets) and compare it 
with previously defined threshold (Fig. 17b). 
This threshold is adaptively set in certain period of 
time and is based on the estimated mean number of SYN 
packets. If measured traffic exceeds a particular threshold 
it will be defined as anomaly and alarm will be activated.  
In order to increase the power of hypothesis test, most 
of the anomaly detection algorithms a sequence of 
observations {yt|t=a,…,b}. If we suppose that the 
observations are independent, the log-likelihood ratio of 
the sequence is: 
 (       )     
∏    (  )
 
   
∏    (  )
 
   
 ∑ (  )
 
   
         ( ) 
where parameter values before and after the change will 
be θ0 and θ1 respectively. The probability density function  
of Y with parameter θ is pθ(y). If the result for the log-
likelihood ratio s(yt) is positive, probably the  random 
values conforms to the distribution after change than to 
the distribution before change. Considering this, it is 
possible to define a threshold h for s(yt) which can reject 
the null hypothesis H0 (for the case θ=θ0) and accept the 
alternative hypothesis H1 (for the case θ=θ1) at a given 
level of significance. This level is compatible to the 
probability of a false alarm. 
 
  
a)      b) 
Figure 17.  Flow charts of considered anomaly detection algorithms 
a) Adaptive threshold algorithm, b) CUSUM algorithm 
 
Here simple model of this algorithm is presented. The 
algorithm is based on fact that St=s(y1, …, yt) has a 
negative drift under normal conditions and a positive drift 
after change. Actually, decision function gt of this 
algorithm compares the increase of St with respect to its 
minimum to a threshold h: 
         
     
      (   (  )      )
 [(      (  )]
         
                                                       ( ) 
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where gt and gt-1 are estimated differences in time-
windows t and t-1. If gt exceeds the given threshold value 
h, the alarm will be activated. 
The threshold h allows trading off the mean detection 
delay and the mean time between false alarms. In the case 
when distribution of Y is unknown, s(yt) must be replaced 
by a statistic u(yt) with comparable properties. The 
expectation value of u(yt) depend on hypotheses. This 
value will be negative under null hypothesis H0 and 
positive under alternative hypothesis H1. This variant is 
often called non-parametric CUSUM algorithm. 
Using statistics u
+(y) = y − (μ0 + K) and u
−(y) = (μ0 − 
K) − y where K is defined as a reference value we can 
detect positive and negative shifts respectively. 
Consequently following two decision function are 
defined: 
  
  [    
     (    )]
      
  
  [    
     (    )]
                               ( ) 
where typical settings for reference value K are σ/2, 4σ 
and 5σ. σ is the standard deviation of Yt. 
The authors of [7] show that although a simple 
straightforward algorithm such as the adaptive threshold 
algorithm can have satisfactory performance for high 
intensity attacks, its performance deteriorates for low 
intensity attacks. They also show that an algorithm based 
on change point detection, such as the CUSUM algorithm, 
can exhibit robust performance over a range of different 
types of attacks, without being more complex. 
B. Practical approaches against SYN-Flood attack 
Netstat command can easily detect whether there is a 
SYN attack. On Linux systems, half-opened connections 
will be marked as SYN_RECV, while on Windows 
systems they will be marked as SYN_RECEIVED. 
Primer (Linux) [21]: 
>netstat -tuna | grep :80 | grep SYN_RECV 
tcp 0 0 192.168.2.1:80 15.55.82.20:1309  SYN_RECV 
tcp 0 0 192.168.2.1:80 51.1.5.7:1743     SYN_RECV 
tcp 0 0 192.168.2.1:80 209.112.192.126:4988 SYN_RECV 
tcp 0 0 192.168.2.1:80 53.12.51.1:1724         SYN_RECV 
… 
This command filters all opened connections per port 
80 (HTTP), and status SYN_RECV (half-opened 
connection). If the output contains a lot of rows that 
contain SYN_RECV, it is likely that a SYN attack 
occurred. Consideration should be given that filtering IP 
address, from which the attack comes, probably will have 
no impact on reducing the attack because the attacker can 
easily spoof packets, respectively spoofs IP addresses 
from which an attack is coming. The IP addresses in most 
cases will be related to the actual source of the attack. 
Although the ultimate solution to prevent SYN flood 
attack is very complex issue, it is possible to perform the 
basic actions that will reduce the impact of this attack. 
Section 3 discusses several proposed effective 
mechanisms for detection and prevention against this type 
of attack. Even more, some effective solutions against 
this attack are considered in RFC 4987 [4]. Anyway, this 
section considers a practical approach to mitigate the 
effects of SYN flood attack. 
LINUX: Enabling SYN Cookies function within the 
Linux kernel will allow "ignoring" of the SYN flood 
attacks, allowing the server to stop the half-opened 
connections when they fill their limit. While the 
connection will be terminated, the server will send a 
SYN/ACK packet to the client, and if it receives an ACK 
response from the client it will reconstruct the previous 
half-opened connection, and enable communication with 
the client.  
To enable SYN cookies inside the kernel the following 
actions should be taken: 
sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=1 
In order to enable SYN cookies during every restart it 
is necessary to edit/etc/sysctl.conf, and enter into a new 
row: 
net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1 
It is recommended to increase the SYN backlog queue 
with a default value of 1024 to 2048: 
sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog=2048 
To set options for each server restart is necessary to 
edit/etc/sysctl.conf, and enter into a new row: 
net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog = 2048 
In the case of SYN attacks in the logs the following 
should occur, but despite the attack server will still be 
able to normally open a new connection toward the 
customers. 
[1116377.589736] possible SYN flooding on port 80. 
Sending cookies. 
[1116439.567828] possible SYN flooding on port 80. 
Sending cookies. 
[1116500.631623] possible SYN flooding on port 80. 
Sending cookies. 
5.2.2. WINDOWS: In order to configure SYN flood 
protection for Windows 2000 and 2003 servers several 
registry entries should be set (Table 1). 
First step is to enable SYN attack protection. 
SynAttackProtect defines whether it is included SYN 
flood protection, and if the value is 0 then it is disabled, 
which means that it should be set to the value 1 for better 
or value 2 for best protection against SYN flood attack 
[22].  
 
TABLE I.  CONFIGURING REGISTRY ENTRIES  
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SynAttackProtect 2 
TcpMaxPortsExhausted 5 
TcpMaxHalfOpen 500 
TcpMaxHalfOpenRetried 400 
TcpMaxConnectResponseRetransmissions 2 
TcpMaxDataRetransmissions 2 
EnablePMTUDiscovery 0 
KeepAliveTime 300000 
 
First step is to enable SYN attack protection. 
SynAttackProtect defines whether it is included SYN 
flood protection, and if the value is 0 then it is disabled, 
which means that it should be set to the value 1 for better 
or value 2 for best protection against SYN flood attack 
[22]. 
10 Analysis of the SYN Flood DoS Attack  
 
Copyright © 2013 MECS                                                  I.J. Computer Network and Information Security, 2013, 8, 1-11 
A denial of service (DoS) attack against Windows 
servers is to send it a "name release" command. This will 
cause it to release its NetBIOS, preventing clients from 
accessing the machine. By setting 
NoNameReleaseOnDemand with registry path 
KEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet 
\Services\NetBT\Parameters to DWORD "1" instead of 
the default "0", other machines will be prevented from 
causing the protected system's name from being released. 
Using the TcpMaxPortsExhausted, TCPMaxHalfOpen 
TCPMaxHalfOpenRetried it is possible to define values, 
primarily limits of the possible number of half-opened 
connections. Within 2008/ Vista/7 Windows the 
protection from the SYN flood attacks is turned on for by 
default, and cannot be excluded. For Windows 2008 
servers it is possible to apply an increase in CPU and 
memory load, because the server releases the half-opened 
connections depending on system load. Manually 
adjustment option as in Windows 2003 Server is not 
possible, but the server adapts the configuration to current 
needs / conditions. 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper one of the vulnerabilities of TCP protocol 
which leads to the SYN flood DoS attack is shown. To 
see the effects of the SYN flood attack and DDoS SYN 
flood attack on other parameters on different types of 
traffic (voice, video, data) in 802.11e environment the 
OPNET Modeler simulation tool is used. The obtained 
results are expected. Namely, during the SYN flood 
attack the situation with all network parameters became 
worse, but even this results are incomparable with the 
dramatically deteriorated results obtained during the 
simulation of the last scenario when DDoS SYN flood 
have been conducted. Finally, effective anomaly 
detection algorithms against SYN Flood attacks are 
presented. Furthermore, the paper shows some practical 
example for mitigating the effects of SYN flood DoS 
attack in Linux and Windows environment. 
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